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Private finance of transport infrastructure, either through direct private provision or 
through public-private partnerships has developed rather further in the UK than in most 
European countries over the past two decades.  It is appropriate to consider what lessons 
can be drawn from this experience.  In particular, does the emphasis on private finance 
lead to a bias in the spatial allocation of investment and what are the consequences of 
this. 
 
The paper uses a framework which identifies the importance of the contractual structure 
for private finance.  This shows how in the presence of asymmetric information it is 
difficult to achieve the expected shifting of risks to the private sector.  Given the 
complexity of such contractual structures, although transactions costs become more 
transparent, they may also be expected to be higher than in a vertically integrated public 
sector provider.  The benefits may thus depend on the private sector being able to 
manage the process of investment and introduction into service more efficiently than 
traditional public sector transport providers. 
 
This paper reviews the UK experience in terms of developments in various modes.  The 
paper highlights the variety of methods of introducing private finance and assesses these 
against the criteria of risk bearing, transaction cost reduction, and efficiency in delivery.  
The key problems are identified as relating to the treatment of network effects and the 
vertical separation of infrastructure and service (unbundling).   
 
The framework is used to assess the extent to which private sector provision impacts on  
regional development either positively, by advancing the provision of infrastructure 
which can provide wider benefits, or negatively by becoming a drag on future 
development by imposing higher costs of infrastructure usage and maintenance.  It 
becomes clear that a distinction needs to be drawn between infrastructure which is 
mainly used for intra-regional transport and that which has an inter-regional or 
international dimension.   
 
   3
2.  THE ECONOMICS OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION  
 
Central to the problem of infrastructure provision is the question of opportunity cost and 
risk.  Fixed infrastructure typically has a zero opportunity cost.  Infrastructure providers, 
unlike transport service providers, cannot cover the risks of their investment by the 
residual value of the infrastructure.  Hence infrastructure should be priced at its short-
run marginal cost, since there is no transfer price of the capital asset to be taken into 
account.   But at levels of usage below capacity the short run marginal cost is effectively 
zero and hence the infrastructure can make no contribution to its capital costs.   
However, the lumpiness and long gestation period of infrastructure prevent perfect 
marginal adjustments of capacity to demand.  This characteristic provides the argument 
for public funding as well as public provision, since only the public sector will be able 
to take future needs into account adequately and ensure the correct level of provision at 
the right time, although this may imply cross-subsidy to cover the shortfall in revenues 
against full costs in an infrastructure priced at short-run marginal costs.  At capacity the 
situation reverses and prices based on short-run marginal cost rise rapidly, making the 
infrastructure cash rich, implying the need for expansion.  Such an expansion, however, 
even if it is able to be financed over its life, will pose problems in its early years when it 
will require subsidy. 
 
Those financing infrastructure face three main types of risk: construction risk; revenue 
and maintenance risk; and planning and political risk.  Construction risks arise because 
of the individuality of large infrastructure projects and their long gestation periods, both 
of which make costs difficult to estimate accurately.  Large infrastructure projects 
frequently require detailed design to be carried out whilst construction is in progress, for 
example to overcome specific construction problems encountered.  Sometimes 
inadequate specification of the project compounds the expected construction cost risk.  
Inefficiency in the management of the construction contract can make it easy for 
contractors to inflate costs and not appear to be responsible for these increases.  There is 
a risk to the commissioning organisation that contractors may systematically 
underestimate the costs involved.  Lower costs increase rates of return and make it more 
likely that projects will be undertaken.  Commissioning bodies may also wish to see the 
costs underestimated in order to get a project accepted.  Once large infrastructure 
projects are started it becomes very difficult to abandon them completely.   4
 
In a recent survey Flyvbjerg et al (2002) (and see Flyvbjerg at al, 2003) suggest that 
infrastructure costs are underestimated in 90 per cent of transport projects and that 
actual costs are on average 28 per cent higher than estimated.  This figure rises to 34 per 
cent for fixed-link (major bridge and tunnel) projects and 45 per cent for rail projects, 
and is around 20 per cent for road projects.  The data used in the study cannot determine 
whether private sector projects are more or less prone to such underestimation than 
public sector projects, but it does suggest that transport projects are not more 
susceptible to this problem than other large infrastructure projects.  
 
Once completed, infrastructure providers also face operational risks.  Where usage is 
below that expected there may be revenue risks.  The tendency to underestimate costs is 
often seen to go together with the tendency to overestimate potential usage.  Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2002, 2003) suggest that the degree of overestimation is greater in rail projects 
(average 40%) than for road projects (9%), but both suffer from a similar degree of risk 
of error. The most difficult infrastructures, those with the highest costs, are likely to be 
those with the greatest risks from the combination of these two factors since they are the 
ones where previous experience is unlikely to be useful.  Where traffic forecasts 
underestimate traffic, this may impose much higher maintenance costs on an 
infrastructure, both because of the need to repair structures designed for lower traffic 
levels and because of the loss of revenue during the repair periods, which will arise 
sooner and more frequently.   
 
Most difficult to assess are the policy and planning risks which any infrastructure 
provider has to take into account.  Long gestation periods and the longevity of pay-back 
periods for major infrastructures makes them vulnerable to changes of policy.   
Enthusiasm for private finance has been tempered where there is a risk that a change of 
government may lead to re-nationalisation.  Even more worrying can be the lack of 
consistency displayed by governments with respect to their own decisions; the lack of 
clarity in the handling of Railtrack by the UK government is an example of this.  When 
this becomes an open conflict between two levels of government, as in the case of the 
mechanism for bring private funding into London Underground, it is difficult for the 
private sector to receive clear signals.   
   5
Changes of policy which affect the competitive position of a mode also cause problems.   
The confusion over Railtrack caused problems for private UK rail operators and their 
commitment to co-financing infrastructure improvements.  Continuing ambiguity over 
the attitude of governments to some form of universal road pricing poses problems for 
potential investors in both road and competing modes. 
 
We need, however, to retain some perspective over the relationship between 
infrastructure costs and total transport costs. Although infrastructure is costly to 
provide, the unit costs of infrastructure per passenger- or tonne-km are relatively small.  
One estimate is that infrastructure costs contribute between 18% and 23% of average 
road costs per vehicle km (including external costs, but excluding congestion) (see ITS, 
2001 and  Link et al, 2000).   
 
A basic rationale for public involvement has been that there are wider economic 
benefits from transport infrastructure which affect both the level, and the spatial 
distribution, of economic activity.  The debate on the impact of infrastructure on 
economic growth and development, and how to capture this in project appraisal, is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Vickerman (2000, 2002) provides a summary of the 
issues and SACTRA (1999) and Mackie et al (2001) discuss the relevance of this for 
evaluation procedures.  The question remains crucial in the debate over funding since, if 
the primary economic impact of public infrastructure is on the productivity of private 
capital, then it is reasonable to expect that part of that surplus should be made available 
to fund the infrastructure.  However, there may be occasions where that surplus would 
lead to infrastructure being built in the wrong place to secure the desired regional 
development/cohesion benefits  Then the public sector has to manage private sector 
pressure for specific investments which may not be seen to be in the wider public 
interest. 
 
The most difficult issue with respect to the balance between the market and planning 
approaches to infrastructure development is the question of network planning.  One of 
the characteristics of private sector financed infrastructure is that it typically has to be 
broken into manageable sized projects in order to be financed.   But transport 
infrastructure only works as a network, thus investors have to be assured that each 
relevant part of the network will be constructed and means have to be found of ensuring   6
that appropriate external spillovers can be identified and compensated.
2  This problem is 
compounded by the need to provide interoperability, now enshrined in successive EU 
transport policy documents.  This limits the scope of individual infrastructure providers 
to minimise costs by providing for access only for users imposing the least costs; for 
example the need for road operators to meet minimum axle weight and safety standards, 
new rail infrastructure to meet common loading gauge and signalling requirements.      
 
We have set out in this section a range of the basic issues which arise in considering the 
provision of infrastructure.  In the following two section we examine how far the public 
and private sectors are able to meet these requirements. 
 
3. FUNDING OPTIONS 
3.1 Public infrastructure and public funding 
The principal rationale for public sector provision of infrastructure is as a public good.  
This implies that infrastructure should be financed directly out of general tax revenues.  
However, infrastructure rarely meets all the criteria for a public good.  Mode specific 
transport infrastructure is excludable and, at levels of use approaching capacity, 
becomes rival.  This shifts the argument towards the externality effects of infrastructure, 
and in particular the wider economic effects. Too frequently these wider effects have 
been used as an assumption rather than as the outcome of a rigorous assessment 
(SACTRA, 1999).  
 
Concern over the validity of the traditional arguments, coupled with the need to reduce 
public sector budgets, led to a retreat from routine acceptance of public funding.  The 
debate initiated by the Aschauer (1989) and Biehl (1986, 1991) studies in the late 1980s 
showed that there were potential wider economic impacts which could justify public 
funding, but that these were not universal and needed to be justified on a case by case 
basis (Gramlich, 1994; SACTRA, 1999). 
 
If there are identifiable external/spillover benefits rather than just a general public good 
contribution, this may raise questions as to why most public sector funding comes out of 
general funds.  Since users of infrastructure create external costs there is a case for 
raising charges for the direct use of infrastructure to reflect this use of resources.  Many   7
of the wider benefits of transport also accrue to individual firms and people, whose 
potential surplus could be expropriated to pay for the infrastructure, but disentangling 
private and social benefits is not easy. 
 
The long gestation and construction periods of infrastructure frequently do not coincide 
with the planning horizons of public finance nor the political cycle of elections.   
Experience with railway investment in the UK has shown clearly the impact which 
public expenditure constraints and short-term horizons have led to levels of investment 
below that which would have been optimal for the system as a whole.  Two related 
points are relevant here; infrastructure does not have an immediate impact on voting 
behaviour and thus is easier to defer than social welfare expenditure, likewise the 
perceived benefits are long-term and diffuse and thus difficult to capitalise into voting 
behaviour. 
 
3.2 Private funding options 
The existence of private benefits is the basis of the case for the private financing of 
infrastructure, but the two principal arguments used in its favour are: concern about the 
ability and efficiency of the public sector in the management of large scale projects and 
the availability of finance capital seeking projects which could advance the scheduling 
of a project.  These two factors are expected to reduce the total cost of a project. 
 
The counter-argument is that the cost of finance to the private sector is typically higher 
than to the public sector, given the higher degree of risk to the former.  This problem 
can be partially overcome if the public sector provides guarantees to ensure that any 
benefits are not lost through inability of the private sector to complete a project.   
However, guarantees reduce the incentive for the private sector to seek cost reductions  
in construction or to be accurate in traffic forecasts.  This necessitates the development 
of more effective contracts which reduce the implicit problem of asymmetric 
information and provide the right incentives. 
 
The operator has to identify the beneficiaries from a project in order that they can be 
appropriately charged.  Since operators will only be able to charge direct users of the 
infrastructure, this requires that total benefits are sufficiently captured by user surplus.    8
This is only likely in projects which are discrete, clearly bounded and largely self-
contained with no close competitor.  For this reason the most common privately 
financed schemes have been bridges and tunnels, but it could also apply to parallel 
roads or express or truck lanes on highways.  Private sector funding of infrastructure is 
thus likely to be associated with a degree of monopoly power and the public sector may 
need to consider exercising some regulatory control.   
 
Most toll bridges and motorways do face price controls, but Eurotunnel, the operator of 
the Channel Tunnel, was not subjected to price regulation given the competition from 
ferries, which are (largely) private sector operated.  It does face some quantity 
regulation in having to provide certain minimum levels of service.  Where franchises are 
granted on the basis of competitive tenders it can be argued that the tendering process 
ensures an element of regulatory control, the idea of competition for the market instead 
of competition in the market, but in practice operational regulation is usually necessary.  
The issue for the public sector is the balance to be struck between seeking the expected 
benefits of private sector finance and maintaining a degree of control for public benefit 
reasons, including the key issue of maintaining appropriate safety standards. 
 
A number of private finance options are open (see Table 1).  The most important 
distinctions are between the full scale private provision of infrastructure and those 
which involve some form of contract between public and private sector.  These involve 
schemes such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP) in the UK.  PFI involves a long-term contractual partnership in which the private 
sector takes on the risks of a venture in return for payments dependent on agreed 
standards of performance.  PPP is a rather more general arrangement between public 
and private sectors (often with legal force) for expected mutual benefit in the provision 
of services.  The distinction between the two is rather blurred with PFI being a specific 
subset of PPP. 
 
Generally the conclusion from UK experience is that full privatisation raises 
considerable difficulties.  The one pure private sector developed scheme, the Channel 
Tunnel, suggests that the expected cost savings in managing construction may not be as 
great as believed and that a PPP scheme such as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link and PFI 
road schemes may have offered better results.  CTRL is currently on schedule and to   9
budget and the Highways Agency estimates cost savings of about 15% on PFI road 
schemes.  The difficulties faced by Railtrack in managing and developing the rail 
network in the private sector without increasing public sector support also cast some 
doubt on pure private sector provision.   
 
The argument against this view usually takes the form that such private sector schemes 
have not worked because of the residual regulation preventing full competition.  There 
are two responses to this.  First, it can be argued that the competition does take place in 
the form of the competitive bidding for the rights.  This is argued to be the most potent 
factor in reducing costs in PFI schemes.  Secondly, it has to be questioned whether a 
framework allowing for full competition, rather than competitive bidding, could ever be 
introduced for major infrastructure. 
 
PFI/PPP schemes, as well as allowing for lower costs of delivery, have typically 
delivered on time at a lower overall costs and thus meet the basic public sector test of 
value for money.  The questions which are raised against such schemes is whether they 
sufficiently transfer risk to the private sector, given the agreement for the public sector 
to make certain contractual payments against a defined performance regime and the 
extent to which projects achieve cost savings, not through greater efficiency but through 
schemes which are inherently less safe.  In the UK all PFI projects have to be set against 
a relevant Public Sector Comparator (PSC), the reference cost of a project in the public 
sector which define the value for money of the private sector option.  Defining the PSC 
then becomes the critical issue. 
 
The PPP scheme for London Underground has been particularly controversial. This 
transfers the management and responsibility for upgrading of the infrastructure (but not 
the ownership) to private sector consortia, whilst control and responsibility for service 
delivery remains firmly in the public sector through Transport for London (TfL).  TfL 
and the London Mayor argued strongly in favour of a public sector managed scheme 
financed by bonds.  There seems to be little to choose in the relative costs of alternative 
means of finance, PPP projects do give savings over the agreed PSC, although bond 
finance appears to be more uncertain (Ernst and Young, 2002).  The real question is the 
effective degree of residual control retained in a PPP scheme. 
   10
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The key questions remain those of the distribution of risk and the level of transaction 
costs in privately financed schemes.  Although the principle of PFI-type projects is that 
there is a shift from the procurement of the assets involved in infrastructure to the 
purchase of the services provided by those assets, with the responsibility for provision 
and management of the assets remaining in the private sector, there is still a residual 
risk left with the public sector.  As has been seen both with the early development of 
CTRL and the later problems with Railtrack, the public sector remains the ultimate   11
guarantor of a scheme. 
 
This raises the question of the appropriate length of any franchise/concession period.  
The usual basis sees the contract fixing a maximum period at the end of which the asset 
reverts to the public sector free of any encumbrances, but reversion will usually occur at 
the time that the asset is fully amortised.  In this way the public sector tries to shift the 
downside risk onto the private sector whilst retaining the upside “risk”.  The concession 
period can become a bargaining issue, as for example in the case of the Channel Tunnel 
where the original concession of 55 years was extended to 99 years to enhance the 
project’s overall value at a time of crisis in the financing.  Later projects have seen the 
transfer of a revenue earning asset to a concessionaire to help provide a cash flow 
during the construction period as a means of easing the potential revenue risk in the 
early years (such as  with the Dartford and Severn bridges).
  
 
The vertical separation of infrastructure and service provision (unbundling) inherent in 
the private finance of infrastructure implies that transaction costs become more 
transparent and therefore open to competitive pressure leading to greater efficiency.  
However, protecting each organisation against risk of default implies contractual 
obligations which may raise effective transaction costs.  This is compounded by the 
asymmetry of information in such contracts which leads to their being incomplete and 
therefore more costly. 
 
In the following section we consider a number of examples of private provision in the 
UK and assess these against the framework developed above.    
 
4. SOME UK EXAMPLES OF PRIVATE FINANCE  
4.1 The Channel Tunnel 
The Channel Tunnel is a unique case and in many respects not typical of private project 
finance.  Entirely privately financed through a fixed-term concession, with neither 
government subsidy nor guarantees
3, the project has a complex contractual structure 
involving two governments, construction companies, banks, and the national rail 
operators.  The total cost increased progressively during construction from €7.5 billion 
to over €16 billion (in 1987 prices), due to problems in construction, changing 
government safety requirements and a delay of about a year in the start of operation.    12
The governments agreed to successive increases in the length of the concession, from 
the initial 55 years to an eventual 99 years.  As well the increase in costs, revenues have 
not met original expectations.  The first three years of operation were characterised by 
intensive price competition from the ferry operators such that revenue yields were much 
worse than had been forecast.  Through rail services have never reached the traffic 
levels forecast.   
 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the experience of Eurotunnel.  First, there was a  
high degree of risk and uncertainty over construction costs and traffic/revenue forecasts.  
Secondly, the concessionaire, Eurotunnel, had no record of project promotion or 
management and experienced problems in negotiating contracts and then managing 
them.  Finally, the exceptional character of the financing necessary for a project of this 
size and complexity posed immense difficulties.  Construction took seven years, during 
which time there was no revenue but a mounting debt, rendering the project unsuitable 
for the typical 15-20 years financing package for projects.    
 
4.2 Railtrack 
The UK attempted to effect a wholesale transfer of its rail system to the private sector.  
The track network was privatised as a public limited company, Railtrack; passenger rail 
services were franchised as 25 separate operations; and freight services were sold to 
private sector companies.  The privatisation of Railtrack was similar to that previously 
used for other public utilities with shares offered to the public at a price which 
discounted the true value of the assets.  Railtrack’s revenue was derived from track 
access charges, regulated by the Rail Regulator, paid by the operators, but derived in 
part from subsidies provided to the franchised operators by the government.  Thus an 
enormously complex contractual structure for the rail industry was created (Figure 1). 
 
Railtrack had to face the consequences of long-term under-investment in Britain’s 
railway infrastructure.  The need was to establish an investment programme to 
modernise the network.  This was to be financed out of Railtrack revenues, borrowing, 
and joint ventures with the public sector where it could be shown that there were wider 
social benefits.  Previous under investment in rolling stock also led to investment needs 







































   Figure 1 Organisational Structure Of British Railways, 2001 
 
Although the income stream from track charges guaranteed by government subsidy 
appeared fairly certain, there was a risk problem in that failure to deliver a slot on the 
network led to a penalty claim by the operator.  Thus if the signalling failed the 
operators of all affected trains were entitled to compensation, if the train of one operator 
derailed due to problems with the track or failed due to rolling stock problems, then a 
complex set of contractual claims ensued.  Given the state of the network this began to 
arise regularly causing Railtrack income problems.  There were also delays in finalising 
the investment programme and the flagship WCRM project began to escalate in costs, 
but the major problem arose due a series of serious accidents each of which identified 
problems with the sate of the infrastructure, or the management of maintenance.  This 
increased Railtrack’s costs and reduced its revenues leading to increased demands for 
government assistance.  Finally Railtrack effectively failed and was placed in 
administration by the government,
4 eventually being replaced by a new not-for-profit 
company, Network Rail, which took over Railtrack’s rail assets in 2002. 
 
The largest rail investment programme, West Coast Route Modernisation (WCRM), is 
an interesting case study of private sector infrastructure problems.  Originally Railtrack 
planned a €2.1bn core investment programme to restore the infrastructure to “modern 
standards”, to which were added upgrades, essentially to allow 200km/h operation   14
(€230mn) and a further enhancement to 225km/h (€930mn).  The latter involved an 
agreement with the main train operator, Virgin.  The allocation of financing between a 
(then) privately owned Railtrack which, however, depended on government funding, 
through regulated track access charges and direct grants for investment, and the 
privately owned rail operator (responsible for making the investment in rolling stock) is 
complex.  The original concept emerged as flawed, as well as the initial management of 
the project, and the project subsequently had to be reformulated into two Phases.  This 
makes it difficult to identify where the costs went out of control, but the total cost of the 
project has risen to at least €9.75bn of which around €6.7bn is the cost of the core 
investment programme over the two phases.  There remains some doubts over the 
achievement of some of the potential benefits of the 225km/h operation for which 
Virgin has spent around €1.55bn on new tilting trains and the current plan is only for a 
delayed introduction of 200km/h operation.   
 
More successful has been a scheme which has been largely outside the influence of 
Railtrack, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link.  CTRL is a PPP scheme  to construct a 120km 
high speed rail line in two stages between London and the Channel Tunnel. The 
government is providing €2.8bn of direct support (to secure the regional benefits), but is 
also supporting a further €5.8bn through guarantees to reduce the cost of the €9bn 
project to the  private sector, a deal which the National Audit Office has deemed to be 
poor value for money.  Actual private finance is thus very limited.   Interestingly this 
project appears to be both on time and on budget as the first stage comes to completion 
for operation in 2003. 
 
It is difficult to identify a clear set of implications from the Railtrack experience, but it 
seems to reflect a number of separate factors.  The initial state of the network was 
clearly a problem, coupled with some inadequacies in management.  The temptation for 
an apparently cash-rich company to appease shareholders with increasing dividends as 
share prices rose rapidly in a stock market boom meant that the investment programme 
was insufficiently developed.  Above all the company came under increasing pressure 
as reliability fell and the fatal accidents led to claims of profitability being placed ahead 
of safety.  It seems unlikely that the principle itself was flawed, the separation of 
infrastructure and services in rail has been required under European Commission 
directive 91/440 of 1991, and although many have argued that the resulting vertical   15
separation is inefficient, Banverket in Sweden has not had the same problems.   
However, the practice in the UK clearly had serious weaknesses, at least in the early 
stages before the creation of a Strategic Rail Authority to provide some overall direction 
to the rail system as a whole.  This has highlighted both the transactions costs problem 
of complex structures and the risks involved in taking on responsibilities within such a 
structure. 
 
4.3 Urban public transit 
The construction of new infrastructure for urban light rail transit has also seen the use of 
private finance in various forms.  The UK has used various forms of public-private 
partnership (PPP) for this type of investment.  In most cases this involves a joint venture 
of construction firms, finance providers and transport operators to provide the private 
investment whilst the public sector contributes some combination of initial grants, 
guarantees and ongoing subsidies.   Not surprisingly the first of these to be completed 
(see Table 2) have occurred in the major urban areas (London, Birmingham and 
Manchester).  There is a long list of projects under construction or at the advanced 
planning stage, with extensions to each of the existing schemes and new projects in  
other cities such as Nottingham, Bristol, Leeds, Portsmouth.   
 
Table 2 Examples of Urban Metro Projects 
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PFI projects have also been used for developments on the London Underground, 
initially for the provision of new rolling stock (e.g. a €635mn project for new trains for 
the Northern Line), but now controversially for maintenance and investment in the 
infrastructure.   
 
4.4 Privately financed road projects 
Whereas the French system of Autoroute concessions uses direct tolls, the UK has used 
a system of shadow tolls.  This involves contracting out the provision and maintenance 
of sections of road to private contractors in return for a payment based on traffic flow 
and a notional toll.  In some cases this has involved transferring the responsibility for a 
complete route in return for new construction (or upgrading) of one section.  The 
incentive to the operator is to balance the higher cost of quality in construction against 
lower potential maintenance costs (and loss of traffic volume and hence revenue) in the 
future.  Eight projects totalling nearly 600 km of route and involving new investment of 
more than €900 million have been completed (see Table 3) and a further two projects 
are in the contract stage. 
 
A concession system has been used for some of the principal estuary crossings.  Two of 
the more recent ones, the construction of new bridges at Dartford on the M25 London 
Orbital Motorway and across the Severn on the M4 London – South Wales Motorway, 
involved transferring existing tolled crossings to the new concessionaire, thus providing 
a source of revenue during construction.  The concessions have a fixed maximum length 
(typically 20 years), but expire when the capital cost of the new infrastructure is 
amortised if that is sooner.  Thus the concessionaire accepts the downside risk, but 
benefits from a better than forecast traffic flow by being released from the concession 
early. 
 
The UK is experimenting with a purely private road, the Birmingham Northern Relief 
Road, to provide an alternative to a particularly congested section of the M6 Motorway.  
The idea is that this should be a section for which users would be prepared to pay for a 
better, less congested, route than the parallel free road.  There have been long delays in 
approving this road and signing the necessary contracts, but construction is now under 
way.  Interestingly, as with the Second Severn Crossing, the route is being configured   17
so as to direct though traffic towards the tolled link.  
 
Table 3 UK DBFO Road Schemes 








A50: Stoke-Derby link 
A30/35: Exeter-Bere Regis 
M40 Denham-Warwick  
A19/A168: Dishforth-Tyne 
Tunnel 








































There are similarities between this scheme and the concept of tolled express lanes on 
some highways in the US.  This idea is being carried forward in Germany with truck 
lanes paralleling existing Autobahn routes for which extra charges would be levied in 
the proposed “A-modell” .  Germany has also had the “F-modell”
5 in operation since 
1994 which relates principally to key links in the network, mainly bridges and tunnels, 
and currently involves 10 projects totalling 70.7km with a total construction cost of  
€2.9bn.  These are designed as tolled links, aided where necessary with up to a 20% 
federal subsidy. (Ewers and Tegner, 2000). 
 
5. THE REGIONAL IMPACTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION 
 
It is not proposed to review the question of the relationship between infrastructure 
provision and regional development in detail here.
6  Our main interest is the way in 
which alternative methods of finance may have differential impacts, positive or 
negative, on regions.   
 
Such differentials can arise from both the type of finance and the source of finance.  
Starting with the type of finance, the relative balance of public and private finance will 
have implications for the fiscal pressure exerted on the region.  Where a public   18
contribution to the finance is required this will require a contribution from the region 
which has to be met via increased taxation (or reduced expenditure on other areas of 
public services) or by borrowing.  Expenditure is required not just for the initial capital 
outlay, but also for the long-term maintenance of the infrastructure.  Even where 100% 
private funding is used there may be some diversion from other uses of such funding 
(e.g. alternative PFI projects in health or education). 
 
The source of finance relates to the geographical and distributional origin of the finance.  
Thus infrastructure projects in economically lagging regions may be funded to a large 
measure by transfers (public or private) from economically more advanced regions.  In 
both cases the overtly redistributional nature of this finance may hide implied greater 
returns to the source region.
7  Where private finance is used this may involve a 
redistribution from areas of grater savings to areas of lower savings, but the greater risk 
often attached to projects in more peripheral regions may cause investors to be more 
reluctant to back projects in less dynamic regions.  This pushes back investment into the 
public sector with the attendant fiscal pressure problems.   
 
As previous sections have identified, however, the key issue to be resolved is the 
distribution of risk.  There is not just the distribution between public and private sectors, 
but also the spatial distribution within each sector. 
   
The evidence from PFI road projects and urban metro projects in the UK suggests a 
rather mixed outcome.  By and large the main projects have been in the more 
economically dynamic regions of the Midlands and South, despite a policy which 
overtly targets transport infrastructure towards the regeneration needs of regions.   
However, some of the larger projects (e.g. the M1-A1 link and A1(M) upgrade in 
Yorkshire) are in more northerly regions.  Historically there had been greater emphasis 
on the  provision of road developments in less prosperous regions as part of regional 
development initiatives, and this may be a reflection of the rebalancing necessary to 
address increasing congestion in the Midlands and South.  Certainly for the private 
DBFO developer receiving shadow tolls, the greater certainty associated with higher 
traffic volumes may be an incentive.  It may also be argued that it is part of government 
redistribution policy to use public funds for roads in lagging regions and use the private 
sector where user benefits can be predicted with greater certainty   19
 
Not surprisingly the first urban light rail developments to be completed  have occurred 
in the major urban areas.  These projects have all required direct government finance in 
the construction phase and/or continuing subsidies in operation.  PFI projects have also 
been used for developments on the London Underground, where there has been a long 
period of failure to manage investment effectively in the public sector.   
 
In the national rail network the two major projects, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link and 
the upgrading of the West Coast Main Line, are clearly major inter-city schemes.   
CTRL, linking London with Paris and Brussels could be viewed as having a very 
metropolitan focus, but also has important regional implications in the provision of 
accelerated regional rail services for the least developed part of the south-east region. 
West Coast Route Modernisation (WCRM) is much more difficult to disentangle in its 
regional effects.  It links the major urban areas of London, Birmingham, and 
Manchester; it parallels one of the most congested stretches of inter-urban motorway; 
and it provides links to less developed areas of Merseyside and the North-west.   
However, it also helps to reinforce the accessibility and dominance of London.     
 
The problems with delivering the upgraded railways has led the Strategic Rail Authority 
to return to the concept of a new dedicated high speed rail infrastructure for London-
North of England/Scotland rail services.  This would, of course, have a major impact on 
regional economies and the battle is clearly on in terms of determining the optimal route 
for such a link.  
 
The location of such investments does not therefore demonstrate a clear regional bias, 
but we still have to face the question of what happens when expectations are not met by 
reality.  Cost overruns or traffic shortfalls may make the initial planned level of service 
difficult to sustain.   This may happen with domestic services on CTRL where the 
consultation document issued by the SRA (SRA, 2003) shows extremely marginal 
returns from even the most basic service pattern.  If such a situation develops local 
authorities may be put under pressure to sustain levels of service through subsidy thus 
placing a long-term fiscal burden on residents.  The problems with the WCRM project 
are placing particular difficulties on some regions because of disruption to service 
through long-term blockades of particular parts of the route – this could have   20
consequences for local business and for regional development.  Judging the long-term 
regional impact of major transport infrastructures thus becomes a more complex issue 
than just a simple cost-benefit calculation; it is one in which the risks and uncertainties 
of the development play an major role.  These risks and uncertainties are compounded 




In this paper we have highlighted how the basic characteristics of infrastructure lead to a 
number of major difficulties in the introduction of private finance.  This has been 
illustrated with examples from British experience in a number of contrasting projects.  
The difficulties arise principally from the various dimensions of risk which are present 
in such projects: construction, operational and planning risks.  However, the sheer 
complexity of major transport infrastructures and how they relate to the operation of 
services leads to problems.  The idea that increased efficiency can be gained from the 
greater transparency of transactions costs when infrastructures separated from operation 
and provided privately has been shown to be misplaced. 
 
The UK examples range from the purely privately financed Channel Tunnel project to a 
variety of public-private partnerships in the provision of new urban public transit 
projects.  Risk, and the ability of the private sector to shift risk back onto the public 
sector, has clearly caused problems in each of the cases examined.  The complexity of 
organisation has caused difficulties, not least in the saga of Railtrack.  
 
At the regional level each of these issues involves both a horizontal and a vertical 
dimension.  Distribution occurs between different spatial units at the same level and 
between spatial units at different levels.  This leads to the possibility of both conflict 
and collusion in the planning and financing of transport infrastructure; both of these are 
likely to led to distortion in the efficient allocation of resources. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that, although private finance may 
have a role to play in the provision of infrastructure, especially where clear private 
sector benefits can be identified, this is only likely to be successful in a public-private 
partnership where a clear allocation of responsibilities between the two sector can be   21
identified and maintained.  Thus estuarial bridge schemes or urban public transit 
projects have been successful, major fixed link or network infrastructures much less so.  
This confirms the view that private sector involvement requires projects to be discrete 




1   This is a revised version of a paper previously presented at the Workshop on Infrastructure, Technical 
University of Berlin, October 2002.   
2   As an example see the question of the completion of the high-speed rail network associated with the 
Channel Tunnel; different attitudes to the network were taken in France and the UK.  In France 
announcement of the construction of the TGV-Nord was made just ahead of the public flotation of 
Eurotunnel; in the UK concern over public opposition to construction of a high-speed line and 
recognition of the problems of separation of the marginal returns to high-speed line and tunnel (which 
had been instrumental in the abandonment of the previous scheme in the 1970s) led to a delay in even 
considering construction of CTRL which will only be completed some 13 years after the Channel 
Tunnel was opened (see Vickerman, 1995). 
3   For a full discussion see Holliday et al. (1991). 
4   This was itself controversial with claims that the government acted too hastily and despite the 
government’s initial view that there should be no compensation for equity holders, the final deal 
setting up Network Rail providing an effective buy-out of shareholders at a price similar to that 
obtaining at the time Railtrack was placed into administration, but implying a substantial capital loss 
on the original privatisation price of shares. 
5   Fernstraßenbauprivatfinanzierungsgesetz 
6   See, for example, Vickerman (2000, 2001) for a fuller discussion. 
7  This relates to the cumulative causation type of analysis implicit in the way improved transport may 
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